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Wednesday, 21 October 2015

Physicalism about mind

Why do many favour supernaturalism about mind - which doesn't have a jot of contingent verifiable evidence? Why do we insist on rejecting metaphysical materialism? Emotional over reason doesn't equal moral sensitivity.

The human brain is the most complex entity we know of according to all scientific measures of structural, natural, and informational complexity. It is more wonderful and not less soY by virtue of having evolved non-teleologically.

Could both qualia (the quality of phenomenal experience) and downward causation (the mind changing brain states) both be real and explained on a physicalist basis.

From the overview:

"Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost."

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