Charles Sanders Peirce: Introduction to a tragic genius.

Charles Sanders Peirce

Bruce R Long B App Sc. (Computing), BA Hons 1 (Philosophy), MPhil (Eng.) PhD candidate (Analytic Philosophy)

Charles Sanders Peirce is known to philosophers as the first serious proponent of scientific and philosophical pragmatism. A trained and capable chemist and polymath who made significant contributions to mathematics and astronomy, Peirce saw his true calling as being that of a logician and philosopher of science. He made groundbreaking and influential contributions to the field of formal logic - which Peirce saw as a conceptual and practical extension of the semiotics, or science of signs, that he himself largely founded.

Among other significant contributions to mathematics and the sciences, Peirce suggested a cardinal arithmetic for infinite numbers well before Georg Cantor's set theoretic contribution, and predicted the use of electrical switching circuits for logic as early as 1887 - well before any developments in the field of computing and the pioneering work of Von Neumann and Claude Elwood Shannon (father of mathematical communication theory and pioneer in transistor logic).

Peirce taught untenured for a time in prestigious settings of Johns Hopkins University - which was to be his last posting due to comprehensive sabotage of his career by his enemies. He had other roles as diverse as calculator for The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey to astronomer for the American Academy of Sciences, and in later life as a consulting engineer and a contributor to American philosophy journal The Monist. 

Peirce's Early Pragmatism, and later 'Pramaticism'

A statement of Peirce's early pragmatism is not difficult, and Peirce's own early definition is perhaps the best to rely upon here:

"Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (Peirce 1878/1992, p. 132)"

The focus on outcomes and abstraction of causal pathways is a mainstay of a lot of pragmatism, but Peirce's focus is on obtaining materially satisfying and verifiable results. An upshot is that, using Peircian scientific pragmatism as a larger scientific philosophy and methodology, one does not commit to believing something a fact without material experimental evidence, and one chooses the least expensive experiment to achieve the minimal results required. A more expensive experiment that gives more accurate results is a practical waste of effort if the lesser results are adequate.

Peirce famously ascribes the intellectual heritage of his thought about pragmatism to Kant's normative approach to metaphysics (the study of what exists and how) and epistemology (the study of what knowledge is and how we get it), but the above statement of pragmatism owes more to theist, theologian, and philosopher Rene Descartes' conception of clear and distinct ideas.

Descartes' concept underlies the famous 'Cogito', which is restated by philosophers as 'cogito ergo sum', or, 'I think therefore I am', according to which the only thing the existence of which one can be truly certain about is one's own mind, as evidenced by one's own thought. For rationalist Descartes, materialistic science was epistemically unreliable (an odd idea for a professional lens grinder, which was largely theologically motivated) but a-priori mathematical and logical concepts were underwritten by the Christian biblical god character as all but infallible. Correspondingly, on an a-priori basis - his thesis/principle of clear and distinct ideas implies that if one can conceive of something clearly and express this in some formal or at least systematic sense, then that which is conceived of is not only possible but real.

Peirce is better described as a deist than a Cartesian style theist or a theist in the more traditional Christian sense, as his conception of god - formulated against the backdrop of the American ideal of manifest destiny and constitutional freedom of religious belief, is significantly incompatible with important tenets of Judeo-Christian theology (Sims, 2008). Peirce's pragmatism incorporates the Cartesian clear and distinct ideas doctrine as only one of three elements, which he expresses in terms of three 'grades of clarity'. Apart from this however, Peirce opposed Cartesian philosophy and philosophy of science as almost comprehensively both inadequate and wrong (Peirce, 1886).

Descartes' rationalist principle of clear and distinct ideas largely comprises the the first grade of clarity, which is attained when one has a clear practical but unreflective and in fact empirical grasp of it. That is to say, everyday empirical experience (for empiricism in general terms is about familiarity with something due to previous experiential encounters or previously experientially accrued information) provides a basis for an unanalysed, unreflective basic grasp of a concept, and this constitutes the first grade of clarity. Note, however, that Descartes' conception of a clear and distinct idea does not require the empirical element but can be completely a-priori (armchair pondering).

The second grade of clarity is special to Peirce. It demonstrates his pursuit of a scientistic, if not scientific, pragmatism, and exemplifies Peirce's idea of himself as a philosopher of science and scientific method. The second grade is attained when one can articulate a general scientifically coherent definition of the concept. The final and perhaps most obviously pragmatic grade of clarity is attained when one can practically apply one's understanding per the first two grades in material application or tasks (Atkin, IEP).

For example, the basic idea of tactile sense perception inherited from the experience of others and one's personal experience of tactile sensory stimuli constitutes a first grade of clarity about tactile sense perception. The ability to define this in terms of the action of the peripheral and central nervous systems and the function thereof would exemplify the second grade of clarity. Finally, such things as the ability to perform surgery to repair nerve damage and the testing of a patient's response to tactile stimuli to diagnose pathologies, as based upon the first two grades, are example of the third grade.

Later in his career Peirce became dissatisfied with both his own earlier conception of pragmatism and that of his intellectual heirs and peers Dewey and James. James' formulation favours a subjective and partly more Cartesian approach to pragmatism, which was unpalatable to Peirce, whose rejection of the a-priori in favour of repeatable scientific experiment and practical proof in terms of measurable effects was a keystone of his pragmatism. Importantly, this meant that Peirce's conception of pragmatism incorporated a notion of what contemporary logicians refer to as soundness: that propositions are only meaningful if there is a demonstrable referent or correspondent for them in the material world.

An upshot of Peirce's original formulation is that an untested diamond could be said to be hard or soft in the absence of material/physical experimental data. In Peirce's later formulation, which regarded certain kinds of law-like or nomic possibilities as real and material, this outcome is removed. Peirce regarded the earlier formulation as a crude 'nominalism', by which he meant not that it was simply about labeling or naming properties, but that according to it the governing laws of physics were not taken to be real and to have a measurable and real predictive influence on the estimation of physical outcomes and belief commitment to facts pre-experimentation (Peirce, 1998).

In formal terms, Peirce's later formulation of pragmatism in terms of logic incorporating scientific methodology and the philosophy of science embraced a realist modalism: possibilities underwritten by experimentally proven physical laws are taken to be real.

Peirce and James, James and Clifford

It is Atkin that has perhaps best succinctly described the contrast between the 'pragmaticism' of Peirce and the pragmatism of his colleague and later rival William James:

"Firstly, Peirce and James have different ideas about the philosophical uses to which a pragmatic method should be put. James is famously anti-intellectualist in his philosophy, distrusting the extent to which we can answer all the important human questions with a materialistic and scientific approach to understanding the universe and our place in it. Peirce, on the other hand, particular in his later work, sees the whole of philosophy embedded within a scientific system and the pragmatic maxim centrally embedded in philosophy. The consequence is that James tends to see pragmatism, and his philosophy, as the stepping off point where materialist and purely intellectualist sciences fail to answer our questions about which beliefs are justifiable. Religious and moral questions require a separate criterion of justification, and this is where a pragmatic method determines what difference I take some such belief to have, and why it is reasonable to hold that belief.

For Peirce, philosophy in general, and the pragmatic maxim in particular, should never stray this far from scientific inquiry. The important philosophical questions, and those with which the pragmatic maxim are concerned, remain firmly within the realm of scientific and intellectualist inquiry. As far as Peirce is concerned, the questions to which James is inclined to apply a pragmatic method are largely beyond the realm of fruitful philosophical inquiry. For Peirce pragmatism is strictly within the realms of scientific sensibilities: for James, it begins at the point where our scientific explanations fall short." (2008, Atkin)

There are larger differences between the overall philosophies of James and Peirce, and in particular Atkin notes that:

 "The primary difference between Peirce and James is that the pragmatic maxim in Peirce’s work is a theory of meaning, but in the hands of James, it becomes a theory of truth. This, however, is due to more crucial differences between the two that mean James’ notion of pragmatism far outstretches a simple meaning criterion, and reflects his more fundamental thoughts about philosophy in general." (2008, Atkin)

James was a theist in a more traditional sense than Peirce, and this can often be seen as a motivation in James' philosophy - especially in his propensity to preserve the panpsychical idea that mind does not require to be the upshot of, or existentially dependent upon, evolutionary processes and an evolved brain-bearing organism (since presumably otherwise it is hard for God to have a mind.) With respect to pragmatism, James was happy to ascribe truth value to a-priori subjective propositions in such as way as belief systems were internally consistent. In brute terms: one should believe what works in one's subjective doxastic context, on a law like basis for consistency. Peirce rejected this. James had a near parallel argument with realist non-theist and non-believer William Kingdon Clifford, who required that belief without material evidence was nonsense and unreliable (Blackburn, 2004, locn 378-423).

James was a publiciser of pragmatism, and credited Peirce with its development. However, Peirce was aware that James highly influential formulation of pragmatism was at odds with his own. Teh argumetn between Peirce and James about the correct definition of scientific pragmatism or pragmatism in the context of scientific methodology and philosophy foreshadowed many of the debates that still take place between materialist reductionists and liberal naturalists, non-reductionists and anti-physcialists.

William James

A Case Study in Cowardly, Infantile, Career Sabotage

Peirce's life is a sad object lesson in human nature and the nature of the American upper class and society: but mostly as a reflection on his peers and rivals. Academics that knew Peirce were often influenced heavily by his teachings (these included John Dewey and William James) and were endearing of him and appreciated him openly (Bertrand Russell referring later to Peirce in Principia Mathematica as America's greatest thinker). Others were less than good-natured.

Peirce's significant achievements and abilities could perhaps be said to be nearly matched by another fact of his life: his misfortune at attracting jealous rivals and detractors. These included John Newcomb and Charles William Eliot - who attempted to sabotage his career regularly and thoroughly, and who in both cases succeeded, largely reducing Peirce to ruin in his later life.

Newcomb

Peirce suffered the pain of facial trigeminal neuralgia in his youth, a condition which caused his face to twitch and which, perhaps understandably had the effect on Peirce that "he was, at first, almost stupefied, and then aloof, cold, depressed, extremely suspicious, impatient of the slightest crossing, and subject to violent outbursts of temper". Apart from this, Peirce is not recorded as having been generally suspicious or paranoid. However, had he voiced suspicion that peers and enemies were clandestinely interfering very effectively with his career, he would have been right.

It is thought that personality defects associated with his condition may have later led Peirce into difficulties with the law in New York, where for a time he was wanted for an assault and for outstanding debts (eventually paid for him by family benefactors). However, it is arguable that this was just as much due to - or rather an outcome of - stress resulting from the abuses meted to him by Newcomb and Eliot, whose behavior is a demonstration that academic prowess is no mark of good character, and in Eliot's case that neither is wealth and 'breeding'.

Newcomb was from a poor background and although brilliant in his own right, his accomplishments paled in comparison to those of Peirce. Time spent learning mathematics and logic in Peirce's family home under the tutelage of Peirce's father Benjamin somehow resulted in an abject jealous hatred of Peirce that was long lasting. When it came to Peirce Newcomb's behaviour was cowardly and less than generous, to say the least. Newcomb single handedly clandestinely torpedoed Peirce's career on two separate occasions. He ended Peirce's career at Johns Hopkins by pointing out to a Hopkins trustee that Peirce had co-habitated with his new wife Zina unmarried following his divorce to his first wife. Later in Peirce's life he again single handedly shut down an application Peirce made to the newly formed Carnegie Institute to finance a book comprising his life's work.

Eliot, Unitarian heir of a wealthy Boston banking family, cousin of T.S. Eliot, and a known plutocrat and union hater, took a dislike to Peirce from their first meetings. Eliot multiply stymied an all but secured posting at Harvard by vetoing Peirce's posting to it on several occasions spanning Peirce's entire career. Eliot himself was a comparatively unremarkable chemistry lecturer/professor and ambitious administrator with an interest in educational reform, whose aims were largely centered on influence. He was responsible for significant reforms of Harvard University under his administration - evolving it into a research university - but ealier in his career he failed to secure the position of Rumford Professorship of Chemistry, and he never attained anything remotely close to the academic and intellectual heights familiar to Peirce.

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In my next article on Peirce, I will discuss in more detail some of his logic and mathematics, and outline some of his semiotic principles. I will also discuss the influence of Peirce's thought on everything from contemporary economics to military thought, and present an analysis of contemporary software development discipline - especially what is called software development lifecycles - in Peircian terms.

1. Atkin, A. (2004). Charles Sanders Peirce: Pragmatism, IEP URL = <http://www.iep.utm.edu/peircepr/#H6>
2. Blackburn, Simon. (2004) "Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed", London: Penguin.
3. Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/peirce/>
4. Brent, Joseph (1998). Charles Sanders Peirce, a life. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. p. 34. ISBN 0-253-21161-1.
5. Eisele, Carolyn. (1957) "The Charles S. Peirce-Simon Newcomb Correspondence", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 101, No. 5 , pp. 409-433 Published by: American Philosophical Society URL = <http://www.jstor.org/stable/985195>
6. Peirce, C.S (1868), "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities", Journal of Speculative Philosophy v. 2, n. 3, pp. 140-57. Reprinted CP 5.264-317, W 2:211-42, EP 1:28-55.Arisbe Eprint
7. Peirce, C.S. 1998. "The Essential Peirce, the Peirce Edition Project (Vol. 2)", Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press.
8. Sims, Jeffrey H. (2008) "A fallible groom in the religious thought of C.S. Peirce – a centenary revisitation", Sophia 47 (2):91-105.